Nova Law Review
Volume 10, Issue 2

1986

Article 12

Reworking the Latent Agenda of Legal
Education
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein∗

∗

Copyright c 1986 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr

Epstein: Reworking the Latent Agenda of Legal Education

Reworking the Latent Agenda of Legal Education
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

Cynthia Epstein is a Resident Scholarat Russell Sage Foundation
in New York City and a professor of sociology at the Graduate

Center at City University of New York. For her highly acclaimed
book WOMEN IN LAW, she received the 1982 Scribes Award and a
1982 American Bar Association Certificate of Merit.

Today, as critical attention has turned to the ideological underpinnings of the law and its structure, it is also useful to consider legal
education in this light. I ended my own brief law school education in
the late 1950's as a result of personally experiencing the alienating
mode of teaching, the competitive atmosphere, and most important -to
me, my intellectual disdain for what seemed to be a context-free analysis of legal subject matter. The explanation for the mode of teaching
and for the atmosphere was the development of adversary skills. The
same explanation was given for the inattention to historical context, an
insistence on the autonomy of the law, separate from other scholarly
disciplines and from other professions and institutions of society.
Although my school, the University of Chicago, was known to be
different from other great law schools of the time for possessing a
somewhat more "liberal" perspective on such matters, and was even
the site of a famous study of the jury system, as a first year student I
was only exposed to the standard required curriculum of property, civil
procedure, torts, contracts, and criminal law. I found it grueling, not
only because of the workload, but because I felt intellectually and morally adrift. The rule of reason used in the legal precedents seemed arbitrary and far from reality, and the precedents themselves appeared
mired in particular social circumstances no longer relevant.
I have since learned more about the dynamics of legal change and
have gained a certain respect for the use of precedent, but having become a social scientist, I am no less appalled by the implicit (and sometimes explicit) notions about human nature in the law and the role of
law in setting parameters for our thinking about the human condition.
Further, I have become more sensitive to the ways in which law not
only reflects common misunderstandings about human character and
social behavior, but also leads the way in characterizing perspectives on
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such issues as normality and deviance, reifies stereotypes about sex and
age, and is the instrument used to generate and maintain inequality (as
well as the instrument used to achieve equality). Examples abound in
legal literature about the ways in which the courts have used the measure of the "rational man" or the mentally functional or ill person in
their judgments about civil or criminal responsibility which have not
been consonant with the informed contemporary views of psychologists
and sociologists. A dramatic illustration is the way nineteenth century
law has defined women as not falling under the category of persons
allowed to practice law (In re Lockwood, 1894), and later, in defining
them as in special need of protection (Muller v. Oregon, 1908). Not
until recently has there been an attempt to go beyond judgments based
on stereotypical assessments of women's and men's "human" nature to
a more rigorous assessment of all people's capacities. Furthermore, as
Hunt (1985) points out, law also transforms human subjects into legal
subjects so that "law influences the way in which participants experience and perceive their relations with others." For example, the law
defines a minor and thus restricts people of certain ages from making
choices while it permits others to control their own lives. Another illustration of this point would be when the law defines some groups of
people as corporations or partnerships, exempting them from obligations which for individuals or other social groups would be considered
questionable.
In the legal distinctions between private and public areas, the law
has allowed the possibility for such problems as unrestrained violence
in the family by defining the family as a sphere governed by different
laws and standards from other groups (or individuals) engaging in the
same activities, such as assault, outside the home (Taub and Schneider,
1982). The extent to which the law reflects social organization and hierarchies, or determines social relations, is a topic of some interest today. However, although legal scholars (Hunt, 1985 & Kairys, 1982)
and practicing lawyers and judges wrestle with these issues, the debates
in which they engage are not evident in the initiation of law students to
the law. Only some students are ever exposed to the analysis of legal
doctrine, and for those who are, it comes late in the process. Rather,
law school initiates most typically face a set of legal givens, are afforded little time to reflect on the meaning, virtues and costs to justice
and humanity of the legal process, and are even discouraged from asking the kinds of searching questions about the profession that might
later move them to challenge the status quo. Like recruits in the army
whose hair is cut short and to whom uniforms are assigned, law school
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss2/12
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recruits are shorn of their prior opinions and sentiments, to be indoctrinated in a mode of thought regarded as the sine qua non of legal thinking. The first year of law school is oriented to ridding the fledgling
student of prior ideological commitments - a process which is itself
profoundly ideological in character.
Of course, the designers of any curriculum must always deal with
the tension between the need to convey the received knowledge in a
field and the need to address the challenges to it. Professors in any
discipline must teach the basics which set the agenda for subsequent
debates, but there is disagreement as to what the basics ought to be. In
law, unlike science, there are no sets of relationships between various
factors that are predictable and explanatory. In short, there are no objectively determined facts. Basics in law refer to the practices and attitudes of former law makers. Students need to know them to learn their
craft but, unlike scientists, cannot objectively determine whether they
are wrong or right. The realm of the legal is the realm of values. Each
generation is encouraged to bring its values into line with the values of
the generations that have gone before, and then to reinterpret them in
such a way as to make them resonate with the contemporary scene, or
rather, a particular segment of the contemporary scene. Legal educators are faced with a perplexing problem: how to create a useful sense
of objectivity in the pursuit of craft.

Teaching in a narrow sense

The particular relationship between the crafting of law and interpretation of law, and the social context in which they are accomplished,
Published by NSUWorks, 1986
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is rarely focused upon in legal education. Thus, attention to the consequences is minimized not only for individuals, but for social groups as
well. In my view, this creates a professional class which tends toward
ethically and politically sterilized concerns which ultimately lean toward the preferences and interests of the most powerful in the system.
As is well known, a good proportion of legal talent goes to the large
firms which defend the interests of the rich and powerful, while relatively few law graduates are attracted to spheres of law which serve the
public interest (or the interests of the less-endowed). Some of the
"blame" for this must be placed on the law schools, which better prepare students for the corporate world than for alternatives in law.
Thus, the legal structure, as it is linked to the structure of society, can
embody a value structure determined not by referendum, but by the
manipulation and coercion of those with entrenched interests.
Up until the past few years, law school also served the profession
and its powerful client group by carefully selecting recruits through
both direct and subtle modes of gatekeeping. Those most blatantly excluded were blacks and women. For the few who succeeded in penetrating the barriers, their experience in law school was unpleasant and
alienating. (My own research on women lawyers (Epstein, 1981) uncovered institutionalized practices of humiliation such as "ladies' days"
when only women were called upon, or separate sections for women.)
After a period of activity outside the profession, and by small pressure
groups within, the profession has become more hospitable to women
and minorities. Their inclusion has had real consequences for the legal
profession beyond merely diminishing the injustice of keeping out people who were not regarded as like-minded. It has made legal educators
more aware of the sexist and racist content in legal casebooks, as well
as changing the interviewing procedures for jobs, the assumptions regarding competence, and many other latent policies and behavior which
reinforced prejudice far beyond the walls of the law schools.
Furthermore, men and women as law professors and students who
were drawn to law in the 1970's, because they saw it as a tool for social
change, helped loosen the hierarchical and oppressive atmosphere in
law schools, and encouraged the kind of thinking that explored the underlying ideologies implicit in law and legal education.
But there has not been a significant change in the profile of legal
educators. The number of blacks and women who have become law
professors, for example, has remained small and is not well distributed
across the profession. Of all full time tenure-track professors, only 6.65
percent are minorities (of any kind). Of all full-time law teachers, 4.7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss2/12
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percent are black, but in addition to tenure-track professors, this figure

also includes those who have one or two year appointments, or are instructors in clinical or legal writing programs.' Although an attempt

was made to bring women and blacks onto law school faculties in the
late 1960's and 1970's because of the pressure of law students and minority caucuses within the profession, the momentum has slowed considerably. Law school efforts to hire women for tenure-track positions
began to lag significantly in the legal profession according to a study by
Donna Fossum (cited in LAUTER, 1984) who also predicted that the
trend may well worsen over the next several years. The research
showed that the gap between the proportion of women in the profession
and the proportion on law school faculties began to widen in the late
1970's and has increased' steadily since then.
Furthermore, law schools remain insular. For example, although
the courts use social science data more and more as a source of evidence, there is little attempt to bring in experts from the social sciences

1. The following are the most recently available statistics (1984) on the composition of law professors (as reported by Kathleen Grove, American Bar Association, Office of the Consultant on Legal Education). The total number of full-time, tenure-track
law professors is 4,461. Of this total, 754 (or 16.9 percent) are women; 297 (6.65
percent) are minorities of both sexes. The total number of full-time law teachers
(which includes clinical instructors, legal writing instructors, and those teaching on one
and two-year appointments) is 4,783. Of this total, 224 (or 4.68 percent) are black men
and women.
In addition, information obtained from the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW
SCHOOLS 1984-85 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF LAW TEACHERS shows for the year 1984 a
breakdown by race of newly-hired full-time law teaching faculty. For males these
figures are: Puerto Rican, 3; Other Hispanic American, 2; Asian American, 4; Black,
15; White, 374 (or 93.9 percent). For women, the figures are: Puerto Rican, 2; Other
Hispanic American, 1; Asian American, 1; Chicano, 2; American Indian, 2; Black, 12;
White, 228 (or 91.2 percent). The AALS states that the total number of minority law
professors nationally is 381; however, they offer no total of all law professors nationally.
2. Of course, the proportion has improved steadily from 1970 when 65 percent of
all law schools had no women on their faculty. By 1983, only two percent had no
women on their faculties and 17 percent had as many as six. Although women and men
law teachers have virtually similar backgrounds, most women faculty members are untenured and most men are tenured. The slowdown in promotion of women is attributed
by some to budget cuts. Higher percentages of women also resigned from law schools,
partially because they went on to the judiciary and executive branch appointments during the Carter administration. But complacency is given as another reason; the heat is
simply off the law schools and they are not as actively recruiting women. And there
remains the problem of law schools, like law firms, being small cultures which seek to
perpetuate themselves with the entry of people who are most similar to themselves,
both in looks and perspective.
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to inform law students about the use (and abuse) of social science findings. Lawyers are consumers of social research even if they are not
producers and they need to be capable of using empirical means in conjunction with legal skills as an intellectual tool for analyzing issues of
legal policy. The call for this kind of knowledge harkens back to Justice
Holmes, who in 1897 wrote "For the rational study of the law, the
black-letterman may be the man of the present, but the man of the
future is the man of statistics and the master of economics" - these
disciplines being the "social sciences of the day" as Wallace D. Loh
(1984) pointed out in his reference to Justice Holmes' remarks. There
is agreement among some contemporary legal scholars, such as Priest
(1983), who has pointed out that the "law student of the future will be
. . . out-of-place without an education of increasingly greater sophistication in social science."
Some years ago, Bruce Ackerman of the Columbia Law School, in
his Storrs Lectures at Harvard (1984), spoke of the need to educate
lawyers in economic analysis and in the use of computer sciences to
understand the data and the consequences of legal interventions. Ackerman did not emphasize the need for education in the social sciences
with the aim of educating lawyers to evaluate sociological and psychological studies. However, not only statistics, but also the findings of
studies - the interpretations of which are disputed in the social sciences - find their way into court cases and can thus be a problematic
source of evidence.
Legal decisions could be so much better informed by understanding that goes beyond the use of expert witnesses. Outstanding advances
in civil rights have been made in our society because of the use of social
science data in Supreme Court cases - Brown v. Board of Education
is the most obvious, but one might also include the important cases on
sex discrimination arising out of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, such as the 1973 American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) consent decree. We can only reflect on how other important
cases could have been decided if lawyers and judges had been sophisticated in the use of social science data.
Insularity would also be diminished if there were more exposure of
students (and faculty) to the creators of law - legislators and other
policy makers. Although there is merit in separating the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government on some levels, there is no
merit in limiting knowledge about the context in which decisions are
made and about the political forces working on them. Law students
ought to become familiar with the political process that creates the
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss2/12
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laws which they must administer, as they will also be required to ascertain the intent of those laws and the interests that are represented in
them. It is too much to ask students to educate themselves about the
political process in this age of specialization, particularly in light of the
grueling work load to which students must submit in law school and in
their first jobs. If law students were exposed to policy makers in schools
and had an opportunity to interact with them, their understanding of
the legislative process would have greater dimension. In short, law students should get a dose of political science in their education, and beyond that, exposure to legislators would also provide the opportunity
for discourse about the responsibilities of each sector of the law
community.
Legal educators aim to create practitioners of craft and they do
well at the task. That these practitioners also become conveyers of values is incidental. The process should be reversed. Craft should follow
and be an instrument for the larger concerns of social values and policy. A more reflexive view ought to be part of a new agenda of legal
education.
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